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DWIGHT HUGHES, et. al. 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
EVA M. CAFFERTY, et. al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Civil No. 960-400-289 
Appellate Court No. 20000866-CA 
Priority No. 15 
NOTICE OF CORRECTION 
RE: REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
Charels M. Bennett 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Evan A. Schmutz (3860) 
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, L.C. 
3319 North University Ave. 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Attorney for Appellants, Eva (Rikki) 
Cafferty and Joseph Hughes 
Attorney for Appellees and Cross-
Appellants, Linnea Bennett, Dwight 
Hughes, and John Hughes 
Comes the Appellees and Cross-Appellants and give notice to the Court and to 
counsel that the Reply Brief of Appellees/Cross Appellants ("Reply") contains an error. 
At page 1 of the Reply, the third sentence of the first paragraph reads as follows: "It 
also correctly states that the 1993 Amendment did legally modify the 1974 Family 
Trust." Ihe sentence should read as follows: "It also correctly states that the 1993 
Amendment did legally modify the 1974 Marital Trust." 
Please note this correction in your copies of the Reply. 
DATED this J ^ day of December, 2001. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
ivap/A. Schmutz 
Attorneys for Appellees/Cross Appellants 
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John Hughes 
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Dwight Hughes 
1042 East Fort Union Blvd., #116 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Charles M. Bennett 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC 
77 West 200 South St., Suite 400 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CROSS-APPELLANTS CORRECJI L\ PORTRAY AND USE THE 1993 
AMENDMENT; RIKKI AND JOE S CLAIM OF "HYPOCRISY" ON THE PART 
OF CROSS-APPELLANTS UN W . V R R A N T E D . 
In their -epK brief. Rikki dnd Joe argue that the Cross- Appellant^ use of the 1°°^ Irrevocable 
Trust and i;ic _v><^  ..r.ei'.v. ; - .. :•• • . ' •-; \*> n^ • "/ K' "' <" • " v ^ 
Appellants' Brief correctly states that the 1993 Amendment does not and cannot modify :K-
Family Trust. It also correctly states that the 1993 Amendment did legally moci3l> 'Ax -. •• - . .../ 
I i list .... - i •=. • •.** : ^ • • *•- •••• -• ' - • ' ' •<i<)" \mendment and none of the 
evidence presented by Rikki and Joe conclusively showed that he was incompetent at that time. As a 
matter of law. Viae was competent when he signed i/.c ..nendment I herefore, as to the Marital I r list, 
f nw. * -r,-!Li ::•/ .eiiance on the 1993 Amendment 15 nui oir proper, it is a legal necessity-
regardless of how they may have personally viewed their father s condition at the time 
of their claims, Rudd and Joe claim that the Cross Appellants "repeatedly seek to bolster their 
arguments that Rikki and Joe acted reprehensibly by asserting Rikki a^,; .^ , L i ; ^ ., ;, r., v r.j icrms 
i)ffht" I'Wl |lnisl J i 1 in u nls| "iRikki and Joe's Reply Briei, i.) Rikki and Joe then cite pages 26-29, 
33, 35, and 38 of Cross-Appellants brief as examples of Cross-Appellants' improper use of the 1993 
documents. An examinai: •• : . c :uici'/;^ , - . . I lust N" ikki ,nu,l Joe's claim o! lr, pnui ,\ r, 
unwarranted and unnecessarily pejorative. 
First, Cross-Appellants cite the 1993 Amendment on page 29 of their Brief to show that R ikki 
1 
and Joe had a duty to account to the other beneficiaries. However, even if the 1993 Amendment were 
totally illegal, Rikki and Joe had the identical duty under the 1987 Amendment and U.C.A. Section 75-
7-303. Both of these provisions are cited by Appellants and their argument is valid even if the 1993 
Amendment is ignored. Therefore, the 1993 Amendment has no practical effect on the validity of 
Cross-Appellants' arguments that Rikki and Joe had a duty to account to the other beneficiaries. That 
duty existed even in the absence of the 1993 Amendment. 
Second, on page 33 of their Brief, Cross-Appellants cite and rely upon the trial court's 
interpretation of the 1993 Amendment provision that allowed Mac's second wife to withdraw funds 
from the Marital Trust, rather than their own interpretation of the 1993 Amendment. 
Third, on page 35 of Cross-Appellants' Brief, Cross-Appellants simply state that the Utah trial 
court quashed the efforts of Joe and Rikki to disregard the 1993 documents and be appointed as 
Mac's conservators in a California court. Cross-Appellants place no reliance in the 1993 documents 
by making this statement. 
Fourth, and finally, on page 38 of Cross-Appellants' Brief, Cross-Appellants correctly point 
out that the 1987 Amendment (which effectively amended the 1974 Marital Trust) provided that 
"trustees 'may be removed and any successor Trustee shall be appointed by the majority vote of 
Mac's children." (Cross-Appellants'Brief, 38.) In making this statement, the Cross-Appellants note 
that the 1993 Amendment did not modify the succession provision of the 1987 Amendment. This 
mention of the 1993 Amendment certainly does not constitute "reliance" on that Amendment since it 
only points out that the 1993 Amendment did not affect trustee succession. Obviously, the same 
argument would be made by stating that the 1993 Amendment was a nullity. 
For all of these reasons, Rikki and Joe's attempt to attack Cross-Appellants as being 
2 
"hypocritical" is entirely without merit. 
II. RIKKI AND JOE SHOULD RECEIVE NO TRUSTEE FEES. 
In their reply brief, Rikki and Joe incorrectly claim that Cross-Appellants assert that "Rikki and 
Joe are not entitled to trustee fees because they illegally served as trustees." (Rikki and Joe's Reply 
Brief, 13.) This claim is inaccurate. Cross-Appellants actually assert that Rikki and Joe are not entitled 
to fees because they breached their fiduciary duties as trustees and acted in bad faith. (Cross-
Appellants' Brief, 36.) The fact that Rikki and Joe also acted illegally simply supports the trial court's 
determination. The record and Cross-Appellants' Brief are replete with evidence of improper conduct 
and illegal actions which provide the basis for denying any payment of trustees fees to Rikki and Joe, 
and that evidence need not be restated. Cross-Appellants only claim that Rikki and Joe served illegally 
as trustees when they refused to abide by a valid act by a majority of Mac's children to remove them as 
trustees. (See Exhibit 13 and Cross-Appellants' Brief at 38-39.) The evidence supports this claim. 
Rikki and Joe are also incorrect in claiming that the trial court failed to determine what 
constituted reasonable compensation under U.C.A. Section 75-7-206. Clearly, the trial court 
performed the precise analysis required by Section 75-7-206. The trial court found numerous 
instances of improper conduct by Rikki and Joe and reduced fees where it determined Rikki and Joe 
had acted improperly. The court found that Rikki and Joe wholly failed to provide evidence as to what 
was a reasonable fee and used an agreement between the parties because it was the only admissible 
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evidence proffered for what constituted a reasonable fee. 
III. UNDER THE 1974 TRUST AND UNDER UTAH LAW, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR 
JOE TO BE THE SOLE TRUSTEE AFTER MAC'S DEATH. 
Rikki and Joe argue that "[i]f the 1974 Trust was not amendable, Joe has always been a 
Trustee of the Family Trust, and he is the only Trustee since Mac's death." (Rikki and Joe's Reply 
Brief, 17.) Rikki and Joe claim that U.C.A. 75-7-405(2) requires such an interpretation. U.C.A. 75-
7-405(2) provides for the assumption of duties by remaining trustees where one trustee ceases to be a 
trustee. However, that section is subject to U.C.A. 75-7-401(1) which states that a "trustee has all 
powers conferred upon by the provisions of this part unless limited in the trust instrument." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Section 75-7-405(2) allows existing trustees to assume the duties of a resigning trustee, but 
does not require it. Section 75-7-401(1) limits the application of Section 75-7-405(2) for purposes of 
succession in this case because the 1974 Trust clearly stated a priority of succession that effectively 
limits the application of Section 75-7-405(2). Section 75-7-401(1) does not allow a trustee to "cease 
to be a trustee" and stay within the same priority. A contrary interpretation would defeat the entire 
purpose of the succession of trustees and render the priorities provision a nullity. If Rikki and Joe's 
argument were accepted, Cross-Appellants could use the same argument to assert that the second 
priority never came into being until Mac's death because under Section 75-7-405(2) Mac simply 
assumed Helen's duties as trustee. Obviously, such an interpretation is absurd. A plain reading of the 
priorities provision requires the conclusion that when Robert Bennett resigned, the second priority was 
extinguished and the third priority came into being. 
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Further, since this issue was not timely appealed, the question of the priority of trustee 
succession is moot and not properly before this Court. 
IV. RIKKI AND JOE'S CITED CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION TO DISALLOW TESTIMONY REGARDING THE QUALIFICATIONS 
OF THEIR SIBLINGS TO SERVE AS TRUSTEES. 
Rikki and Joe cite In re Lowe ys Estate, 68 Utah 49, 249 P. 128 (1926) as support for their 
claim that the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding the competence of their siblings to 
serve as trustees. Rikki and Joe claim that they were justified in "resisting the appointment of their 
siblings as Trustees" because they were "unqualified." (Rikki and Joe's Reply Brief, 18.) 
Rather than support Rikki and Joe's position, Lowe actually refutes it. In Lowe, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that a donee of a will could remove a trustee and appoint another at will where a 
trust document expressly gave her that power. In dicta, the Court noted that this express power to 
substitute trustees would not be disturbed by the Court "in the absence of a showing by some one 
interested in the trust estate that the substituted trustee was incompetent for some reason . . . . " Id. at 
131 (emphasis added). 
Lowe shows the impropriety of Rikki and Joe's actions and the fallacy of their claim because it 
notes that if an interested party objects to a change of a trustee, the proper recourse is to recognize the 
change and then petition the court for relief, not to unilaterally refuse to make the substitution. Rikki 
and Joe are claiming that they were justified in assuming the authority of the court and resisting the 
efforts of their siblings to be trustees because, in their own opinion, their siblings were not competent. 
Unless expressly set forth in the trust document, the supervisory power to determine the competency of 
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a trustee does not rest in an interested party-it rests with the court. As stated by the Court in Lowe: 
"we have no doubt it is the law, that the supervisory power of the court having jurisdiction of the trust is 
sufficiently broad to protect the other beneficiaries of the trust from the selection by the donee of a 
trustee which is disqualified or unfit to administer the trust. . . ." Id. 
Furthermore, U.C.A. 75-7-401 limits a trustee to the powers conferred on him by the trust, 
and none of the Trusts in this case allow a trustee to ignore the provisions expressly providing for 
removal of trustees. Of course, this issue should not be entertained by this Court in the first place 
because the issue of who should have been a trustee was fully and finally resolved in 1998. That 
decision was not timely appealed and cannot be raised at this point. 
V. CROSS-APPELLANTS HAVE NOT MISCHARACTERIZED THE RECORD. 
Rikki and Joe claim that the Cross-Appellants have repeatedly mischaracterized the record. 
The eight alleged instances of mischaracterization merely reflect differing interpretations of the evidence. 
Rikki and Joe's interpretation is at odds with the Cross-Appellant's and the trial court. Cross-
Appellants admit that there is one instance of a misstatement by Cross-Appellants (the March 1994 
Order appointed Leora as Mac's sole conservator and Leora and Joe as Mac's co-guardians rather 
than vice-versa), but this innocuous mistake has no bearing on any issue before this Court. Similarly, 
the other alleged "mischaracterizations" are not relevant to any issue on appeal, and if they were, Rikki 
and Joe could, and should, have raised them in an appropriate argument. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons set forth herein, Cross-Appellants respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
6 
trial court's Final Judgment with respect all claims made by the Appellants and to reverse the trial 
court's denial of accounting fees for the NED accounting and to remand this case for determination of 
proper amounts to be charged against Rikki and Joe for their breach of duties as trustees, the NED 
accounting, and Linnea and John's attorney's fees. 
DATED this 7th day of November, 2001. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Evan A. Schmutz 
Lance N. Long b 
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